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This article analyzes the politicаl economy of energy restructuring in East Germany and Poland from 
the perspective of social distribution. Its purpose is two-fold: on the one hand, it provides analytical 
dichotomies between regulatory vs. procedural and horizontal vs. hierarchical restructuring to 
explain the different paths in the liberal transformation of the energy industry in East Germany and 
Poland. The substitution of a central and legitimate government by Treuhand in the East German 
case as well as the central coordinating role of the government in the Polish case constitute the key 
indicators for these conceptual distinctions. On the other hand, post-socialist energy firms are treated 
as social distribution mechanisms, whose restructuring is defined by a public ownership minimum. 
Contrary to Treuhand, which functioned as an institutional sponsor for an ethnically-driven transfer 
of the East German energy sector to a set of subsidiaries of West German corporations, the Polish 
Ministry of Privatization preferred to adopt the equity constraint rather than regulate its energy policy 
preferences through the private sector. Private organizations or semi-legitimate public agencies 
captured by corporate interests have no incentive to maintain the public ownership minimum as 
the central government can. The existence of distributive energy firms implies distributive energy 
bureaucracies; the preservation of a public ownership minimum rather than inter-elite privatization 
contracts is a prerequisite for energy-driven distribution in post-socialism. 
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Introduction
The Oder-Neiße borderline between the 
German Democratic Republic and Poland did 
not only signal Germany’s defeat in the Second 
War and the end of Prussia as a formative 
component of German political identity and 
economic development;1 it also hallmarked highly 
differentiated patterns of enterprise restructuring 
in the transition period following the dissolution 
of the USSR and led both communist economies 
to divergent sets of industrial arrangements. The 
purpose of this article is to unfold the economic and 
institutional mechanisms that created divergent 
corporate structures in the energy sectors of East 
Germany and Poland; in its next stage, the article 
treats these structures as fixed and analyzes their 
role as social distribution mechanisms. Why the 
energy sector? I contend that the increased role 
– 411 –
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
of public interest in the continuity and diversity 
of energy production combined with the cross-
nationally observed inclination of the socialist 
and post-socialist state to exercise direct or 
indirect control over their natural resources 
justifies this choice. Furthermore, the significant 
share of energy companies in the industrial 
GDP of GDR and Poland as well as the social 
cleavages rising in the aftermath of restructuring 
implementation in both countries form the basis 
for a second question;2 what were the distributive 
effects of energy restructuring and how can 
they be translated into the ex novo formation of 
socio-economic strata in East German and Polish 
societies? 
There is a clear distinction between 
restructuring and privatization. Restructuring 
can occur before or after privatization, 
but unlike privatization it does not touch 
ownership relations inside an enterprise;3 the 
latter can be either a State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) or a private corporation. Hence, 
corporate restructuring focuses on debt 
reduction, attraction of state aid and foreign 
direct investment, boost of labor productivity, 
employment adjustment, reform of corporate 
governance, increase of exports and profitability, 
and new marketing strategies. Nevertheless, 
the time differential between restructuring 
and privatization can be so small that the 
boundaries between these two phases in market 
transition are uncertain.4 The East German and 
Polish energy sectors pose interesting cases in 
that direction, given their common state origins 
and their distinct structural features. The 
Polish energy sector has had a higher degree 
of diversity in resources: oil, gas, electricity 
and coal (lignite) have constituted the main 
market fields, open to structural reform.5 On 
the contrary, the East German energy sector 
is determined by coal (lignite) and electricity 
production, while natural gas has only had a 
marginal role in domestic growth, as the GDR 
never enjoyed natural gas reserves.6 
This plurality in Polish energy resources 
does not change the fact that Poland has been 
one of the most coal-dependent countries in the 
world (US Department of Energy Overview). 
Coal dependence has been the main common 
energy industry feature across the Oder-Neiße 
borderline. However, what I observe in East 
Germany and Poland is the distinction between 
procedural and regulatory energy restructuring. 
What I define as procedural restructuring is the 
organizational reform of SOEs with the imminent 
purpose of privatization. There is practically 
no difference between the time point of 
privatization and the time point of restructuring. 
Moreover, the direct involvement of Treuhand 
as the institutional intermediary between the 
East German government and West German 
energy corporations indicates a multiplicity of 
actors that participated in the restructuring and 
privatization process;7 thus, I can also argue for 
a critical distinction between horizontal and 
vertical (hierarchical) energy restructuring; 
horizontal energy restructuring is linked to 
the implementation of energy reform plans by 
institutional coalitions that do not belong to the 
same administrative or hierarchical line.
I define Polish energy restructuring as 
regulatory and vertical (hierarchical).8 The 
adjective regulatory refers to restructuring 
implementation with the use of administrative 
acts. Its purpose is not imminent privatization, 
but the preservation of state control and the 
maintenance of lower subsidized energy prices 
for both social and electoral reasons. Hierarchical 
restructuring is the top-down implementation of 
organizational reform at the enterprise level. The 
government alone is the common denominator 
of all restructuring efforts; foreign investors and 
international organizations are complementary 
rather than central in the reform process. In 
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addition to these theoretical formulations, I argue 
that the difference between shock therapy and 
gradualism, which is observed in the East German 
and Polish cases, is heavily influenced by the 
factor of state sovereignty. East Germany’s energy 
restructuring was designed as a consequence of 
the abolition of the country’s sovereignty;9 in 
Poland energy restructuring was connected to a 
transition to a new form of government within 
set geographical boundaries, but with diversified 
economic foundations. 
In the aftermath of these parallel reform 
processes, the distributive role of companies 
emerged in both countries is evaluated in terms 
of employment, income, education, pensions, and 
labor representation. More specifically, I intend 
to analyze the impact of energy restructuring in 
East Germany and Poland in terms of equality 
rather than liberty. The underlying normative 
principle of economic liberalization in Eastern 
Europe is reversed; if the purpose of the state is 
to advance individual liberties constrained by 
social deliberations, then this article provides an 
explanation that reverses the roles of liberty and 
equality. Now equality is the objective principle 
and liberty the constraint. Social distribution is 
used as a proxy for equality to the same extent 
that privatization is used as a proxy for liberty. 
The article is organized as follows. In 
Section 1, I propose an ideal type of industrial 
restructuring and then I compare the politics 
of energy restructuring in East Germany and 
Poland based on my aforementioned distinctions. 
In Section 2, I treat energy firms as social 
distribution mechanisms through the lens of the 
public ownership. Section 3 proposes a two-
dimensional map on the interaction between 
energy restructuring and social distribution. 
Moreover, it stresses the derived observation that 
the existence of distributive energy firms in post-
socialism implies the existence of distributive 
energy bureaucracies. The treatment of energy as 
a public rather than private good is critical in that 
respect. Section 4 concludes. 
I. Models of Industrial Transition  
in former Eastern Germany  
and Poland
To provide an effective analysis of energy 
restructuring in East Germany and Poland I 
propose an ideal type of industrial restructuring 
in the period of transition from a communist to 
a capitalist economy. The actors of my model 
include the state, which is the owner of any given 
enterprise and represents people’s interests, 
institutional intermediaries that assist the state 
in restructuring implementation such as banks, 
independent agencies, international organizations 
and private advisors. The organizational division 
of the firm into smaller corporate units, which 
become financially viable with state subsidies, 
FDI and bank loans, is considered to be the first 
step toward efficient restructuring.10 Furthermore, 
the substitution of public managers with short-
term skilled personnel and preservation of the 
government’s veto against to block any major 
proposal presented in the board of directors 
constitute the second step in the restructuring 
process. 
Profitability and therefore liquidity is the 
key proxy used to evaluate the success of the 
restructuring phase.11 Increased market value for 
the firm is translated into higher state revenues, 
increased job security for the currently employed 
and sustainable economic growth. Export 
growth, increased labor productivity, cash flow 
as well as total factor productivity are treated as 
functions of profitability; the term organizational 
restructuring encompasses both what the 
literature calls organizational and financial 
restructuring.12 Privatization is regarded as the 
final component of industrial transition, which is 
an inclusive term that I use both for restructuring 
and privatization. The institutional map of 
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privatization does not have the state as its main 
point of reference, as is the case in restructuring.13 
On the contrary, it entails a significant bargaining 
role for entrepreneurs who are willing to acquire 
governmental shares in state corporations.14 It 
also includes supporting institutions, which can 
be either financial (banks), international (World 
Bank and IMF), or administrative (agencies) 
with a broader and more independent statutory 
mandate.15 
Because the goal of privatization should be 
a contract, where economic efficiency and social 
justice meet, I argue that the government has to 
preserve a package of vetoing minority shares 
in the post-privatization period. This should be 
particularly the case for sectors of reinforced 
public interest such as energy, infrastructure, 
and telecommunications.16 I treat this package 
of shares as a public ownership minimum that 
affects the management’s decisions about 
employment relations, when both phases of 
industrial transformation are over.17 My transition 
theory of corporate governance necessitates an 
alliance between the unions and the government. 
The imposition of the public ownership minimum 
protracts the privatization process and increases 
the number of private contenders.18 Thus, the 
bargaining position of the private investor is 
restrained, but not to such an extent that he opts 
to exit the transaction. In this approach minority 
state ownership does not have a positive, but a 
normative component (Meyer 2002: 269-274).19 
The government does not care about maximizing 
the value of its stocks, but its reelection. By 
blocking decisions against labor interests, it 
indirectly implements social policy. 
This two-stage concept of industrial 
transformation can be applied in the cases of 
East German and Polish energy restructuring. 
When the Berlin Wall fell, East Germany’s 
energy industry consisted of the electrical 
power industry and lignite (brown coal) mining 
operations in Lusatia and Middle Germany.20 The 
Electricity Treaty (Stromvertrag) signed among 
the Treuhand – East Germany’s privatization 
agency – the GDR government and seven West 
German firms on August 22 of 1990 led to the 
creation of the Unified Energy Plants as a joint-
stock corporation (Vereinte Energiewerke AG); 
this company included the East German lignite 
power plants, which had been already restructured 
by the Treuhand for that purpose.21 Treuhand was 
not as efficient in selling the lignite mines per se; 
Middle German mining operations were finally 
bought by PowerGen plc, Morrison Knudsen 
Corporation and NRG Energy Inc., which 
formed the Middle German Lignite Corporation 
(MIBRAG BV).22 Nevertheless, it was able to 
sell the Lusatia mines to a business consortium 
formed by RWE AG and Viag/Veba (Lausitzer 
Braunkohle AG).23 It is evident why the definitions 
of procedural and horizontal restructuring 
are useful to conceptualize the industrial 
transformation of the East German energy sector. 
Treuhand functions as a quasi GDR government, 
whose mandate and legitimacy is derived from its 
institutional linkage to West Germany’s political 
and economic system.24 The immediate transition 
from restructuring to privatization resulted in the 
rapid generation of property rights; the source of 
these property rights was not the East German 
government, but the Treuhand.25 This was the 
first time in the history of democratization and 
industrial transformation that an administrative 
agency was subjected to the laws of a foreign 
country (West Germany) and then privatizes 
the energy infrastructure of a country, despite 
the obvious welfare spillovers that this series 
of policies would impose on GDR’s populous 
working class.
Communist economies are two or three 
times more energy intensive than capitalist ones; 
this feature is likely to endure in early transition 
period.26 The economic report on East German 
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energy sector in 1990 confirms the belief that 
this industry can form the basis for generalizable 
research conclusions; while the energy sector 
did not occupy a leading position in the share of 
industrial employment, it reflected accurately the 
changes in labor relations and employment during 
the post-reunification period.27 The negative 
slope of the East German energy intensity 
curve between 1990 and 1994, which implies a 
parallel decrease in both energy consumption and 
production, shows Treuhand’s objective to fully 
change the sectoral distribution of East German 
industrial GDP.28 This strategic decision was not 
supported with a sustainability plan for neither 
power plants nor mining operations; on the 
contrary, it linked them to the corporate interests 
of West German multinationals without taking 
into account the input from either East German 
state governments or trade unions.29 
The procedural and horizontal nature of 
East German energy restructuring now becomes 
evident.30 I argue that restructuring served 
exclusively the interests of West German energy 
oligopolies;31 not only did it increase energy 
market concentration and therefore violated even 
more antitrust law in the New Germany, but it also 
facilitated an unprecedented bargaining between 
energy multinationals and an administrative 
agency for resources and infrastructure that 
belonged to the people, whose legitimate 
representative was certainly not the Treuhand.32 
Energy restructuring in East Germany should be 
seen as a seminal paradigm of an ethnically driven 
FDI externalization and state capture. Although 
West and East Germans belonged to the same 
state (German Empire) before the Second War, 
this does not serve as a justification for Bonn’s 
raw economic intervention into a foreign state 
entity.33 The distinction between vertical and 
horizontal restructuring, which will be further 
elaborated in the Polish case, does not refer to 
the way that the old Kombinate were reorganized 
or liquidated but to the matrix of institutional 
players that participated in the unbundling 
process. Treuhand’s failure to generate a surplus 
between restructuring revenues and expenditures 
undermined the infrastructural modernization 
of the East German energy companies and had 
an adverse effect on the overall competitiveness 
of the German economy.34 Particularly in the 
energy sector, the rapid transfer of privatization 
costs from producers who bought underpriced 
power plants and brown coal (lignite) mines to 
consumers who had to pay higher prices and 
many of them lose their energy industry jobs or 
see their wages decrease constitutes the most 
ample manifestation of Treuhand’s politically 
conservative bias and pro-business orientation.35
I argue that in Poland the state remained the 
main source of energy industry transformation 
(hierarchical and regulatory). Energy 
restructuring was defined not only in terms of 
privatization, but also in terms of energy law 
reform, commercialization of energy enterprises, 
energy pricing and policy-relevant issues for 
each subsector.36 The World Bank’s seminal 
proposal on Polish energy restructuring outlined 
the reform steps that were actually implemented 
in this sector; privatization of infrastructure was 
designed and advanced under the regulatory 
supervision of five different ministries. Pricing – 
while still subsidized – was cost-reflective to 
the best possible extent, and in many cases 
state management was accountable to workers 
councils.37 The Polish Oil and Gas Company 
(PGNG) is the most important corporate actor 
in the oil and gas sectors and was owned by the 
state; nevertheless, Poland’s limited gas and broad 
oil dependence on Russia render the politics of oil 
and gas industry transformation less interesting.38 
What matters most is electricity restructuring 
and the regulation of the Upper Silesian lignite 
mines that have been intertemporally accounting 
for a major component of electricity production.39 
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The government maintained direct control over 
PSE SA, the Polish National Grid, as well as over 
the generation and distribution companies until 
mid-1990s; only when the Energy Act entered 
into force and adjustment to the European 
acquis became a serious incentive for energy 
restructuring, the state embarked on a partial 
privatization of its energy assets.40 
Polish transition to market economy is 
considered to be a success story for shock therapy 
privatization proponents. However, I suggest 
that in energy restructuring rapid privatization 
was certainly not the case. Unlike East German 
restructuring where the boundaries between 
restructuring and privatization are substantially 
blurred, Polish energy industry was transformed 
under the public ownership minimum that I 
described in the beginning of this section; this 
observation is also supported by the weakened 
role of the Privatization Ministry and the 
increased role of workers’ councils in enterprise 
restructuring.41 Differentials in profit and time are 
large enough to make a clear distinction between 
restructuring and privatization; the latter stage 
was largely concluded upon Polish accession to the 
European Union. It is reasonable to hypothesize 
that the government in Warsaw has been reluctant 
in the public offerings of its energy assets. This 
is in line with the results of its mass privatization 
programs; their scope was not as wide as 
initially expected and in sectors where extensive 
privatization took place it was due to the impact 
of foreign experts rather than administrative 
pressures.42 Hence, energy restructuring is one 
of these policy initiatives where the government 
decided to defend its ownership shares; minority 
state ownership in the energy sector was seen as a 
method of offsetting the negative welfare effects 
of employment decline.43 Contrary to Russian 
privatization schemes, direct rather than indirect 
bureaucratic intervention in the restructuring 
and privatization of energy SOEs preserved a 
minimum equality threshold in Poland necessary 
for social solidarity.44 
II. Energy Firms  
as Distributive Mechanisms:  
The Oder-Neiße Dichotomy
Social distribution is inherently connected 
to the idea of the allocation of public resources by 
the government.45 In this article, I do not intend 
to limit my analysis to the political mechanics 
of energy restructuring and privatization. I also 
propose an analytical path that links the industrial 
transformation of energy assets to equity; it is 
assumed that restructuring and privatization 
as a two-stage process provides the firm with 
a series of property assets that are taxable by 
the government. In that respect, I suggest that 
the public ownership minimum determines the 
distributive power of the firm both toward its 
employees and the citizens. I contend that the 
same set of incentives that prevent the government 
from fully privatizing the energy sector is also 
valid for the explanation of energy firms as social 
distribution mechanisms; thus, state ownership, 
unemployment benefits and taxation may be 
considered as forms of social insurance that 
bridge corporate restructuring with inequality 
alleviation.46 When transition to market economy 
occurs, the government is not likely to treat the 
energy sector as a first priority privatization area, 
because this would radically increase energy 
prices, inflation and unemployment rates; this 
it would bolster an evolving social crisis that no 
government wants to face. Energy restructuring 
and privatization may be seen as a more powerful 
but indirect way of social distribution; firms that 
receive less subsidies and pay more in social 
services and compensation for their employees 
are “rewarded” with lower taxes and vice versa.
The existence of the public ownership 
minimum defines my understanding of energy 
firms as social distribution mechanisms in the post-
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communist context of East Germany and Poland. 
I argue that in the former German Democratic 
Republic distributive energy restructuring 
did not occur due to biased and unilaterally 
inspired macroeconomic and political planning. 
Minimization of state ownership over electricity 
markets and coal operations, dramatic increase of 
the East-West unemployment differential without 
taking proper policy measures and the conclusion 
of industry- rather firm- or employee-centered 
collective wage contracts indicate what the 
Treuhand’s finite regulatory objective was: the 
political and resource expropriation of the East 
German energy sector rather than the preservation 
of social stability with the maintenance of a 
public ownership minimum, which is a sine 
qua non component of positive distributive 
dynamics in the energy sector.47 Lignite industry 
production and employment data in the 1990s 
amplify a radical decrease in energy significance 
for East Germany, which becomes broader as the 
time distance from 1990 increases; the lignite 
employment/lignite production ratio also becomes 
exponentially smaller.48 Schleiniger has argued 
that the exemption of energy-intensive export 
sector from environmental-friendly taxation can 
increase energy use because energy-intensive 
commodities are cheaper and therefore substitute 
for labor-intensive commodities;49 taxation of 
energy companies does not distribute per capita 
income for the benefit of lower-class people, 
unless it discourages producers from shifting 
the additional cost of taxation to consumers 
without the provision of any additional public 
goods or social services. The goal of a tripartite 
social contract becomes critical here; because 
antagonistic relations among capital, labor and 
the government are constrained by minority state 
ownership and the public interest component of 
energy business, the establishment of a social 
contract can only occur under conditions of 
stringent labor and corporate tax regulation with 
direct or indirect distributive effects. I contend 
that the energy sector is the main industry 
from which the distributive intentions of any 
government can be clearly inferred.50
The maintenance of powerful regulatory 
mechanisms in the Polish energy sector 
prevented the adjustment of energy prices to 
efficient levels; it is shown that although rich 
people make a much more extensive use of 
electrical power, any price increase in residential 
electricity is much more likely to hurt workers, 
pensioners, self-employed people and social 
transfers recipients, whose energy expenditure 
occupies a relatively large share of their total 
expenditure basket.51 I argue that the prospect 
for upward mobility (POUM) motivates lower- 
and middle-income citizens to support the 
public ownership minimum in the energy sector 
given the limited price elasticity (in comparison 
with mature market economies) and the strong 
income elasticity of energy consumption.52 The 
Polish Ministry of Privatization chose to sell 
state-owned energy enterprises only if it was 
able to substantially support the state budget; 
thus, complete corporate restructuring has 
been treated as a prerequisite of privatization 
due to the distributive considerations of the 
government.53 More specifically, the energy 
administration in Warsaw opted for negative 
rather than positive distribution by continuing 
to subsidize electricity prices while maintaining 
variable but significant control over domestic 
energy firms.54 
III. Analytical Framework 
The arguments presented above lead to the 
following propositions:
1. Propositions
P1: The public ownership minimum rather 
than full privatization guarantees the survival 
of energy firms and the maintenance of social 
peace. 
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P2: Hierarchical rather than horizontal 
energy restructuring leads to socially distributive 
subsidies and prices. 
P3: Procedural rather than regulatory 
energy restructuring is likely to benefit producers 
at the expense of consumers. 
P4: Institutional and political legitimacy of 
the regulatory authority are prerequisites for 
effective energy restructuring. 
2. Corollaries 
C1: The Treuhand was the institutional 
sponsor for an ethnically-driven transfer of the 
East German energy sector to a set of subsidiaries 
of West German corporations. 
C2: The Polish Ministry of Privatization 
preferred to adopt the public ownership minimum 
rather than regulate its energy policy preferences 
through the private sector. 
Moene and Wallerstein argue that higher 
degrees of inequality do not automatically 
generate support for social spending in the 
form of publicly financed insurance; this is the 
case only when public distribution is targeted 
toward lower-income people that already have 
a job rather than to unemployed people or 
pensioners.55 To provide a primary analytical 
design on the interaction between energy 
restructuring and social distribution, I suggest 
a two-by-two matrix (Matrix 1) where energy 
restructuring forms the first axis of analysis 
and sectoral workforce constitutes the second 
axis of analysis. I classify energy restructuring 
into two categories according to its sequential 
timing with respect to privatization; a high 
value is assigned when privatization follows 
restructuring, whereas a low value is assigned 
when privatization precedes restructuring. 
Sectoral workforce is evaluated on the basis 
of its vocational training; the government can 
restructure its own energy assets considering 
the welfare of either high- or low-skilled energy 
workers. 
According to matrix 1, when energy 
restructuring benefits the interests of high-
skilled workforce and energy privatization 
follows restructuring, then social mobility is 
likely (High, High); hierarchical restructuring 
makes the government in charge of the industrial 
transformation process. Under the condition 
that the government is in control of energy 
restructuring and sectoral transition rents are used 
to improve the status of high-skilled workers, then 
social mobility is expected; the public provision of 
a resource-based insurance to the qualified middle 
class generates sufficient levels of occupational 
mobility. In the lower left entry of the matrix (Low, 
High) the government supports its low-skilled 
workforce; due to their limited skills in the phase 
anteceding restructuring, they can only use public 
insurance in a non-positive way, i.e. to reduce their 
unemployment risk, but not to find a more qualified 
job. That is why labor peace is achieved. 
In the upper right entry (High, Low) I 
combine procedural restructuring with the 
interests of high-skilled workers; the immediate 
transfer of state-owned energy assets to private 
investors reduces the volume of energy rents 
that the government can distribute. Hence, high-
skilled employees are incentivized to change 
their occupational status; however, this change is 
constrained by the limited quantity of the public 
insurance provided. This is why it is more likely 
to observe horizontal (intersectoral) rather than 
vertical labor transfers. The lower right entry 
(Low, Low) implies limited public insurance 
for low-skilled workers; socially disruptive 
unemployment is the expected policy outcome, 
because the latter are not any more protected by 
the public ownership minimum. 
Distributive energy firms imply the 
existence of distributive energy bureaucracies; 
since the fall of centrally planned economies, 
culture and the “symbolic-ideological control” 
of resources have been in decline in Eastern 
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Europe.56 The level of adherence to the political 
legacies of socialism defines the distributive 
role of bureaucracy in the transition period. The 
appropriation of the East German government 
by Treuhand and the centralized authority of the 
Polish Ministry of Privatization constitute two 
extreme phenomena in the energy map of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. Unlike 
the institutionally supported oil privatization 
in Russia and the successful implementation of 
shock therapy policies in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, Poland suggests a case where energy 
bureaucracies maintained the majority of their 
regulatory privileges. At the same time, in East 
Germany they ceased to exist. 
I define social distribution as the set of those 
expenditure-minimizing policies that maintain 
a minimum of social welfare for all citizens.57 
Because there is no objective definition of equity, 
social distribution can never be value-free or 
impartial.58 As Nee points out, the transition 
from socialism to capitalism entails the transfer 
of resources from hierarchies to markets; 
nevertheless, gradual reforms can preserve the 
social stratification observed under socialism and 
maintain the significance of bureaucracy in the 
market allocation of resources.59 To examine the 
impact of energy bureaucracies on centralized 
and decentralized marketplaces, I propose a 
two-by-two matrix (Matrix 2) where energy 
bureaucracy constitutes the first dimension 
and economic organization the second. I divide 
energy bureaucracy according to its regulatory 
capacity; when the public ownership minimum 
is preserved, then I assign a high value. The 
opposite holds when the energy sector is fully 
privatized. Economic organization is explained 
in terms of centralized vs. decentralized markets; 
centralized marketplaces imply interventionist 
governments with sufficient ownership shares in 
the economy. On the other hand, in decentralized 
markets, the state plays an intermediary role in 
the regulation and allocation of resources. 
I suggest that when energy bureaucracy 
maintains an ownership minimum in centralized 
market systems, then social distribution is 
feasible (High, High); the government is able 
to subsidize energy prices at a low cost and thus 
ensure a minimum of energy consumption for all 
citizens. This is the entry where I locate the Polish 
energy sector. When the government maintains 
an ownership minimum in decentralized 
Matrix 1
Energy Restructuring → Privatization Ex Post → 
Hierarchical Restructuring (High)
Privatization Ex Ante → 
Procedural Restructuring (Low)Sectoral Workforce ↓
High-Skilled Workforce (High) Social Mobility Intersectoral Transfers 
Low-Skilled Workforce (Low) Labor Peace Disruptive Unemployment 
Matrix 2
Energy Bureaucracy →
Public Ownership Minimum (High) Full Privatization (Low)
Economic Organization ↓ 
Centralized Markets (High) Social Distribution Patronage Networks 
Decentralized Markets (Low) Union Corporatism Elite Contracts
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marketplaces, then union corporatism is the 
political equilibrium; advanced rather than 
transition European economies could qualify for 
that entry, where public ownership meets labor 
co-determination and tripartite negotiations 
(Low, High). 
Nevertheless, when energy bureaucrats 
give up their distributive potential and approve 
full-scale privatization policies, while economic 
organization is still defined by a centralized 
marketplace, then the formation of patronage 
networks between business and government is 
observed; the cases of energy privatization in 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states 
are indicative in that respect (High, Low). In the 
lower right entry (Low, Low), the privatization 
of energy firms in decentralized markets leads 
to elite contracts between the government and 
corporate investors; after the contracts are 
concluded, the government ceases to control 
its energy assets; this was the case for the East 
German electricity sector whose privatization 
followed German reunification. 
IV. Conclusions 
The politics of energy restructuring in East 
Germany and Poland provides a paradigm of the 
theoretical inclination presented here, contrary 
to the general and often appraised theory of 
democratic transitions in East-Central Europe. 
The Oder-Neiße dichotomy shows that the public 
ownership minimum rather than the withering 
of public regulation is the most effective basis 
for collective welfare and the increase of public 
revenues through privatization. The thesis of this 
article is heavily influenced by the normative 
foundation of equity rather than liberty. It is clear 
how crucial the role of two administrative bodies, 
the Polish Ministry of Privatization and the 
Treuhand, has been despite their variable political 
legitimacy and connections to the domestic 
business community. A major part of this article 
has focused on the administrative and social 
aspects of energy restructuring. Because the 
energy sector has been the epicenter of industrial 
development under socialism and post-socialism, 
it is crucial to link its ownership transformation 
to the ex novo class formation, which has been 
observed in Eastern Europe. 
My analysis brings together two elements 
which have made this part of the world invariably 
important in the history of world economy and 
economic thought: Marxist economics and 
energy resources.
1 Craig Gordon. “The End of Prussia”. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 124, No. 2, (Apr. 29, 1980): 
97-99. 
2 Falkinger Josef. “Social Instability and Distribution of Income”. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 15 (1999): 
35–51.
3 Carlin Wendy, Colin Mayer, Hans-Werner Sinn, and Vittorio Grilli. “Restructuring Enterprises in Eastern Europe”, Eco-
nomic Policy, Vol. 7, No. 15, (October 1992): 312-352, at 314-318.
4 Ibid, at 317-321.
5 Lill Bruno. Energy Sector in Poland. Center for Markets in Transition, HSE, October 2001.
6 Yandle Traci J. “The Impact of Governing and Economic Institutions on Energy Systems Development: A Case Study of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic”, Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 24, 
No. 1, 1999, Accepted Manuscript.
7 Webber Douglas. “The decline and resurgence of the German model': The Treuhandanstalt and Privatization politics in 
East Germany”, Journal of European Public Policy 1:2, 1994, 151-175, at 151-155. 
8 For an overview of the restructuring and privatization of SOEs in Poland see Rondinelli Dennis and Jay Yurkiewicz. 
“Privatization And Economic Restructuring in Poland: An Assessment of Transition Policies”, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology Vol. 55, No. 2 (April, 1996): 148-152.
9 Horst Siebert. “The integration of Germany: Real economic adjustment”. European Economic Review 35 (1991): 591-602, 
at 600-602; Hall John and Udo Ludwig. “German unification and the market adoption hypothesis”. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 1995, 19, 491-507, at 492-492 and 504-505. 
10 Barrel Ray and Dawn Holland. “Foreign Direct Investment and Enterprise Restructuring in Central Europe”. Economics 
of Transition, Vol. 8 (2) 2000: 477-504, at 500-501.
– 420 –
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
11 Blaszczyk Barbara. “Privatization and Company Restructuring in Poland”. Working Paper No. 18, CASE Reports, Center 
for Economic and Social Research, March 1999, at 23-26.
12 Pohl Gerhard et al. “Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence and Policy Options”, World 
Bank Technical Paper No. 368, 1997: 12-19. 
13 Gray Cheryl W. “In search of owners: Privatization and corporate governance in transition economies”, The World Sank 
Research Observer, Vol. 11, No. 2 (August 1996): 179-97, at 190-192. 
14 McMillan John and Christopher Woodruff. “The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies”. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 153–170, at 156-159. 
15 See the legal foundations of East German and Polish corporate privatization in Bolton Patrick, Gerard Roland, John 
Vickers, and Michael Burda. “Privatization Policies in Central and Eastern Europe”, Economic Policy Vol. 7, No. 15, 
(October 1992): 275-309.
16 For a good account of the reasons why privatization and industrial transition may not conincide see Brada Josef C. 
“Privatization is Transition--Or is it?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 10, No. 2, (Spring 1996): 67-86.
17 Debande Olivier and Guido Friebel. “A positive theory of give-away privatization”, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 22 (2004): 1309– 1325, at 1321-1323.
18 Meyer Klaus E. “Management challenges in privatization acquisitions in transition economies”. Journal of World Busi-
ness, 37 (2002): 266-276, at 267-268.
19 Ibid, at 269-274.
20 Michel Jeffrey H. “Status and Impacts of the German Lignite Industry”, Air Pollution and Climate Series 18, The Swedish 
NGO Secretariat on Acid Rain, at 10. 
21 Ibid, at 34.
22 Ibid, at 35-36; Hansen Ulf. “Restructuring the East German energy system”. Energy Policy Vol. 24. No. 6: 553-562. 1996, 
at 556.
23 Michel Jeffrey H. “Status and Impacts of the German Lignite Industry”, Air Pollution and Climate Series 18, The Swedish 
NGO Secretariat on Acid Rain, at 38.
24 Lehmbruch Gerhard (1994). “The process of regime change in East Germany: An institutionalist scenario for German 
unification”, Journal of European Public Policy 1:1, 115-141, at 138-139.
25 For a thorough account on the creation and enforcement of property rights in post-socialism, see Rapaczynski Andrzej. 
“The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, (Spring 1996): 87-103.
26 Hughes Gordon. “The Energy Sector and Problems of Energy Policy in Eastern Europe”, Oxford Review for Economic 
Policy Vol. 7, No. 2, at 78-81. 
27 Economic Report. “The East German Industrial Sector in 1990”. 1991: 10-13. 
28 Hansen Ulf. “Restructuring the East German energy system”. Energy Policy Vol. 24. No. 6: 553-562. 1996, at 553-556; See 
also Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft EV. Dateien. Essen und Koeln, Januar 2009, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen. 
29 Webber Douglas. “The decline and resurgence of the German model': The Treuhandanstalt and Privatization politics in 
East Germany”, Journal of European Public Policy 1:2, 1994, 151-175, at 154-160. 
30 Estrin Saul. “Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1, 
winter 2002: 101-124, at 108-110.
31 In Kettler Hannah E. (1997). “The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East Germany: the implications 
for enterprise restructuring”. Review of Political Economy 9 (2): 139-142 I find a useful analysis of the reasoning behind 
the takeover of East German corporate entities by leading West German firms. 
32 An interesting theoretical approach on Treuhand’s failure to boost sustainable competition combined with a minor ap-
plication in the energy sector is also offered by Dale Gareth “More shock than therapy: Why there has been no “miracle” 
in Eastern Germany”, Socialism and Democracy, (2002): 108-115 and 121; For a more moderate evaluation of Treuhand’s 
politics see Priewe Jan. “Privatisation of the industrial sector: the function and activities of the Treuhandanstalt”, Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics 1993, 17: 333-348. 
33 I propose the name Bonnhand instead of Treuhand; My take is in contrast with Schütte Tjark (1993). “Bad debt problems 
and enterprise restructuring in Eastern Germany”, Post-Communist Economies, 5 (2): 161-185.
34 Roesler Jorg. “Privatisation in Eastern Germany. Experience with the Treuhand”, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 46, No. 3, 
(1994): 505-517, at 508.
35 Brezinski Horst. “Privatization in East Germany”, Moct-Most, N. 1, 1992: 11 and 18. 
36 Joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. “Poland: Energy Sector Restructuring Pro-
gram, Volume I”, Report No. 153/93: Annex 1. 
37 Joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. “Poland: Energy Sector Restructuring Pro-
gram, Volume I”, Report No. 153/93: Main Report; The Polish administrative bodies involved in the energy restructuring 
process were the Ministries of Industry and Trade, Environment and Natural Resources, Finance, Local Government, and 
Privatization. 
38 Naimski Petr. “Energy diversification strategy for Poland”, Columbia University, September 17th 2007, at 4-7.
39 Kaminski Jacek. Energy sector overview in Poland. Mineral and Energy Economy Research Institute, Polish Academy of 
Sciences.
40 Mantorski Zbigniew. “Polish electric energy sector just before accessing European Union”, Int. J. Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Management, Vol. 6, Nos. 1/2, 2006, at 53-57; See also Ministerstwo Gospodarki. “The Citizen, Market and 
Competition: Organisational, Structural and Structure of Ownership Transformations in the Fuel and Energy Sector”, 
Appendix 3. 
– 421 –
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
41 Squires Meaney Constance. “Foreign Experts, Capitalists, and Competing Agendas: Privatization in Poland, Czech 
Republic and Hungary”. Comparative Political Studies 1995, 28; 275, at 286-291.
42 Blaszczyk Barbara. “Privatization and Company Restructuring in Poland”. Working Paper No. 18, CASE Reports, Center 
for Economic and Social Research, March 1999, at 11-15 and 45-46. 
43 Ibid, at 23.
44 Kenway Peter. “The role of the state in privatization in Poland and Czechoslovakia”, Moct-Most, N. 2, 1993, at 67-69.
45 Kitson Michael, Ron Martin and Frank Wilkinson. “Labor Markets, Social Justice and Economic Efficiency”. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 2000, 24, 631-641.
46 Cremer Helmuth and Pierre Pestieu. “Distributive Taxation and Social Insurance”. International Tax and Public Finance, 
3:281-295 (1996), at 292-293.
47 Wolfgang Franz, and Viktor Steiner. “Wages in the East German Transition Process: Facts and Explanations”. German 
Economic Review 1 (3): 241-269, at 246-247, and 256-264; Bispinck Reinhard. “Collective Bargaining in East Germany: 
Between Economic Constraints and Political Regulations”. Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, 17: 309-331.
48 Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft EV. Der Kohlenbergbau in der Energiewirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im 
Jahre 2006. Essen und Koeln, November 2007. 
49 Schleiniger Reto. “Energy tax reform with exceptions for the energy-intensive export sector”. Working Paper No. 73, 
Institute of Empirical Economics, University of Zurich, February 2001, at 10-15.
50 For an interesting take on the interaction between market regulation and social distribution in East Germany see Solga 
Heike and Martin Diewald. “The East German Labor Market After German Unification: A Study of Structural Change 
and Occupational Matching”, Work, Employment & Society, Vol. 15, No. 1: 95–126.
51 Freund Caroline and Christine Wallich. “Public-Sector Price Reforms in Transition Economies: Who Gains? Who Loses? 
The Case of Household Energy Prices in Poland”. Economic Development and Cultural Change 1997: 35-59, University of 
Chicago University Press, at 46-47 and 52-55. 
52 Benabou Roland and Efe A. Ok. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Distribution: The POUM Hypothesis”. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics May 2001: 447-487, at 447-453.
53 Milewski Roman. “The Effects of Privatization of SOEs in Poland and East Germany”. Research Support Scheme Open 
Society Institute, May 1999, at 18-19.
54 Falkinger Josef. “Social Instability and Distribution of Income”. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 15 (1999): 
35–51, at 49-50.
55 Moene Karl Ove and Michael Wallerstein. “Inequality, Social Insurance and Distribution”. American Political Science 
Review Vol. 95, No. 4 (December 2001): 860-874, at 863-865.
56 Verdery Katherine. “A Prologue to the Transition”, American Ethnologist, Vol. 18, No. 3, Representations of Europe; 
Transforming State, Society and Identity, (August 1991): 419-439, at 434. 
57 Titmuss Richard. “The Role of Distribution in Social Policy”, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 20, 1965: 14-20, at 
14-15. 
58 Rittel Horst W. J. and Melvin M. Webber. “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, 1973: 
155-169, at 167-169. 
59 Nee Victor. “A Theory of Market Transition: From Distribution to Markets in State Socialism”, American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 54, No. 5, (October 1989): 663-689, at 678-679.
V. References
Aghion Philippe and Olivier J. Blanchard. “On privatization methods in Eastern Europe and their 
implications”. Economics of Transition, Volume 6 (I), 1998: 87-99.
Barrel Ray and Dawn Holland. “Foreign Direct Investment and Enterprise Restructuring in 
Central Europe”. Economics of Transition, Vol. 8 (2) 2000: 477-504.
Benabou Roland and Efe A. Ok. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Distribution: The POUM 
Hypothesis”. Quarterly Journal of Economics May 2001: 447-487.
Bispinck Reinhard. “Collective Bargaining in East Germany: Between Economic Constraints and 
Political Regulations”. Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, 17: 309-331. 
Blaszczyk Barbara. “Privatization and Company Restructuring in Poland”. Working Paper No. 
18, CASE Reports, Center for Economic and Social Research, March 1999. 
Bolton Patrick, Gerard Roland, John Vickers, Michael Burda. “Privatization Policies in Central 
and Eastern Europe”, Economic Policy Vol. 7, No. 15, (Oct., 1992): 275-309.
Bonin John P. and Bozena Leven. (2001). “Can State-owned Banks Promote Enterprise Restructuring? 
Evidence from One Polish Bank's Experience”, Post-Communist Economies, 13:4, 431-443. 
– 422 –
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
Brada Josef C. “Privatization is Transition--Or is it?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 
10, No. 2, (Spring 1996): 67-86.
Brezinski Horst. “Privatization in East Germany”, Moct-Most, N. 1, 1992. 
Carlin Wendy, Colin Mayer, Hans-Werner Sinn, and Vittorio Grilli. “Restructuring Enterprises in 
Eastern Europe”, Economic Policy, Vol. 7, No. 15, (October 1992): 312-352.
Craig Gordon. “The End of Prussia”. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 
124, No. 2, (Apr. 29, 1980): 97-99. 
Cremer Helmuth and Pierre Pestieu. “Distributive Taxation and Social Insurance”. International 
Tax and Public Finance, 3:281-295 (1996). 
Dale Gareth “More shock than therapy: Why there has been no “miracle” in Eastern Germany”, 
Socialism and Democracy, (2002): 93-136. 
Debande Olivier and Guido Friebel. “A positive theory of give-away privatization”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004): 1309– 1325.
Economic Report. “The East German Industrial Sector in 1990”. 1991: 10-13. 
Estrin Saul. “Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1, winter 2002: 101-124. 
Falkinger Josef. “Social Instability and Distribution of Income”. European Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 15 (1999): 35–51. 
Franz Wolfgang and Viktor Steiner. “Wages in the East German Transition Process: Facts and 
Explanations”. German Economic Review 1 (3): 241-269. 
Freund Caroline and Christine Wallich. “Public-Sector Price Reforms in Transition Economies: 
Who Gains? Who Loses? The Case of Household Energy Prices in Poland”. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 1997: 35-59, University of Chicago University Press. 
Gray Cheryl W. “In search of owners: Privatization and corporate governance in transition 
economies”, The World Sank Research Observer, Vol. 11, No. 2 (August 1996): 179-97.
Hall John and Udo Ludwig. “German unification and the market adoption hypothesis”. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 1995, 19, 491-507.
Hansen Ulf. “Restructuring the East German energy system”. Energy Policy Vol. 24. No. 6: 553-
562. 1996.
Headey Bruce, Peter Krause, and Roland Habich. “East Germany: Rising Incomes, Unchanged 
Inequality and the Impact of Distributive Government 1990-92”. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
46, No. 2, (June 1995): 225-243.
Horst Siebert. “The integration of Germany: Real economic adjustment”. European Economic 
Review 35 (1991): 591-602.
Hughes Gordon. “The Energy Sector and Problems of Energy Policy in Eastern Europe”, Oxford 
Review for Economic Policy Vol. 7, No. 2. 
Joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. “Poland: Energy 
Sector Restructuring Program, Volume I”, Report No. 153/93. 
Kaminski Jacek. Energy sector overview in Poland. Mineral and Energy Economy Research 
Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences. 
Kaufmann D., Kraay A., & Zoido-Lobaton P. (1999). Aggregating governance indicators (Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2195). Washington, DC: World Bank.
– 423 –
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
Kenway Peter. “The role of the state in privatization in Poland and Czechoslovakia”, Moct-Most, 
N. 2, 1993
Kettler Hannah E. (1997). “The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East 
Germany: the implications for enterprise restructuring”. Review of Political Economy 9 (2): 
117-149. 
Kitson Michael, Ron Martin and Frank Wilkinson. “Labor Markets, Social Justice and Economic 
Efficiency”. Cambridge Journal of Economics 2000, 24, 631-641.
Kočenda Evžen and Štěpán Čábelka. “Liberalization in the Energy Sector: Transition and 
Growth”, Manuscript 1998. 
Lehmbruch Gerhard (1994). “The process of regime change in East Germany: An institutionalist 
scenario for German unification”, Journal of European Public Policy 1:1, 115-141.
Lill Bruno. Energy Sector in Poland. Center for Markets in Transition, HSE, October 2001.
Mantorski Zbigniew. “Polish electric energy sector just before accessing European Union”, Int. J. 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, Vol. 6, Nos. 1/2, 2006. 
McMillan John and Christopher Woodruff. “The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition 
Economies”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 153–170.
Menz Georg. “Old bottles – new wine: The new dynamics of industrial relations”. German 
Politics, (2005) 14:2, 196-207.
Meyer Klaus E. “Management challenges in privatization acquisitions in transition economies”. 
Journal of World Business, 37 (2002): 266-276.
Michel Jeffrey H. “Status and Impacts of the German Lignite Industry”, Air Pollution and Climate 
Series 18, The Swedish NGO Secretariat on Acid Rain. 
Milewski Roman. “The Effects of Privatization of SOEs in Poland and East Germany”. Research 
Support Scheme Open Society Institute, May 1999. 
Ministerstwo Gospodarki. “The Citizen, Market and Competition: Organisational, Structural and 
Structure of Ownership Transformations in the Fuel and Energy Sector”, Appendix 3. 
Minogue Martin. “Apples and Oranges: Problems in the Analysis of Comparative Regulatory 
Governance”. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance Vol. 45 (2005): 195-214.
Moene Karl Ove and Michael Wallerstein. “Inequality, Social Insurance and Distribution”. 
American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 4 (December 2001): 860-874. 
Naimski Petr. “Energy diversification strategy for Poland”, Columbia University, September 17th 
2007. 
Nee Victor. “A Theory of Market Transition: From Distribution to Markets in State Socialism”, 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5, (October 1989): 663-689.
Pohl Gerhard et al. “Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence and 
Policy Options”, World Bank Technical Paper No. 368, 1997.
Priewe Jan. “Privatisation of the industrial sector: the function and activities of the Treuhandanstalt”, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, 17: 333-348. 
Rapaczynski Andrzej. “The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights”, 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Spring 1996): 87-103.
Rittel Horst W. J. and Melvin M. Webber. “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Policy 
Sciences, Vol. 4, 1973: 155-169.
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
Roesler Jorg. “Privatisation in Eastern Germany. Experience with the Treuhand”, Europe-Asia 
Studies Vol. 46, No. 3, (1994): 505-517. 
Rondinelli Dennis and Jay Yurkiewicz. “Privatization And Economic Restructuring in Poland: 
An Assessment of Transition Policies”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology Vol. 55, No. 2 
(April, 1996): 145-160.
Schleiniger Reto. “Energy tax reform with exceptions for the energy-intensive export sector”. 
Working Paper No. 73, Institute of Empirical Economics, University of Zurich, February 2001. 
Schütte Tjark (1993). “Bad debt problems and enterprise restructuring in Eastern Germany”, 
Post-Communist Economies, 5 (2): 161-185. 
Sinn Hans-Werner and Alfons J. Weichenrieder. “Foreign Direct Investment, Political Resentment, 
and the Privatization Process in Eastern Europe”, Economic Policy, 1997: 179-209. 
Solga Heike and Martin Diewald. “The East German Labor Market After German Unification: A 
Study of Structural Change and Occupational Matching”, Work, Employment & Society, Vol. 15, No. 
1: 95–126.
Squires Meaney Constance. “Foreign Experts, Capitalists, and Competing Agendas: Privatization 
in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary”. Comparative Political Studies 1995, 28; 275. 
Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft EV. Dateien. Essen und Koeln, Januar 2009. 
Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft EV. Der Kohlenbergbau in der Energiewirtschaft der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 2006. Essen und Koeln, November 2007. 
Titmuss Richard. “The Role of Distribution in Social Policy”, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 28, 
No. 20, 1965: 14-20. 
Uerge-Vorsatz Diana, Gergana Miladinova, and Laszlo Paizs. “Energy in transition: From the 
iron curtain to the European Union”, Energy Policy 34 (2006): 2279–2297. 
US Department of Energy. “An Energy Overview of the Republic of Poland”. Fossil Energy 
International, Society, Electronic Resource. 
Verdery Katherine. “A Prologue to the Transition”, American Ethnologist, Vol. 18, No. 3, 
Representations of Europe; Transforming State, Society and Identity, (August 1991): 419-439. 
Webber Douglas. “The decline and resurgence of the German model': The Treuhandanstalt and 
Privatization politics in East Germany”, Journal of European Public Policy 1:2, 1994, 151-175. 
Yandle Traci J. “The Impact of Governing and Economic Institutions on Energy Systems 
Development: A Case Study of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic”, Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, Accepted Manuscript. 
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis. Energy Restructuring and Social Distribution in the Transition Economies of East Germany…
Реструктуризация энергетического сектора  
и социальное распределение в переходных экономиках  
Восточной Германии и Польши
Т.Н. Григориадис
Греческий Фонд Европейских 
и Внешнеполитических Исследований, 
Греция 10676, Афины, Проспект Вас. Софияс, 49
В статье анализируются политические и экономические аспекты реструктуризации 
энергетического сектора в Восточной Германии и Польше с точки зрения социального 
распределения. Ее цель двояка: с одной стороны, она обеспечивает аналитическую дихотомию 
между регулирующей и процедурной реструктуризацией, с другой – между горизонтальной 
и иерархической. Таким образом, можно объяснить различные пути реформирования 
энергетических отраслей Восточной Германии и Польши. Замена центрального и законного 
правительства Тройхандом в Восточной Германии, а также центральная координирующая 
роль правительства в случае Польши являются ключевыми показателями этих концептуальных 
отличий. Постсоциалистические энергетические компании рассматриваются как механизмы 
социального распределения, реструктуризация которых определяется минимумом 
общественной собственности. Вопреки Тройханду, который стал институциональной основой 
для передачи энергетического сектора бывшей ГДР на множество дочерних западногерманских 
корпораций, польское министерство приватизации предпочло поддерживать экономическую 
справедливость, а не разрешить проведение полной приватизации в энергетической отрасли 
страны. Кажется, частные организации или государственные институты, которые связаны 
с корпоративными интересами, имеют меньше стимулов для сохранения этого минимума 
общественной собственности, чем центральное правительство. В энергетических секторах 
переходных экономик, сохранение минимума общественной собственности, а не полная 
приватизация является необходимым условием социального распределения.
Ключевые слова: энергетика, реструктуризация, приватизация, социальное распределение, 
Восточная Германия, Польша, Tройханд, минимум общественной собственности.
